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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LINDA G. KANGAS,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 940633-CA
RALPH C. KANGAS,
Defendant and Appellant,

Priority No. 15

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (1994) (appeals from district court involving
domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, IN THIS CASE, IS
EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE FACT THAT APPELLEE IS ABLE TO ENJOY A HIGHER
STANDARD OF LIVING THAN THE APPELLANT?
This matter was preserved for appeal based upon the
presentation of evidence presented and the closing argument of
counsel.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court judge abused his discretion in his
establishment of unjust alimony award.
Where a trial court may exercise broad discretion,
we presume the correctness of the court's decision
absent "manifest injustice or inequity that
indicates a clear abuse of discretion.
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d at 819-820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982).
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1994).
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.7 (1994).
Art. I, § 1, Utah State Constitution.
Art. I, § 7, Utah State Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the case:
This case arises from a divorce trial.

II.

Course of proceedings:
This case went through several pretrial hearings,none

of which are at issue in this appeal, the case was finally tried
to the court on June 9, 1994.
Ill• Disposition in trial court:
The plaintiff below was granted a Decree of Divorce.
IV.

Statement of facts:
The parties herein were married on October 11,

1969 (TT p. 28). They have two minor children who remain at
home. (TT p. 29). In the Decree of Divorce the appellee was
awarded the marital residence.

(see paragraph 10 of the Decree
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of Divorce, hereinafter DD para. 10). The appellee was also
awarded alimony in the amount of $700.00 per month (DD para. 13).
The court found that appellee had the ability to earn $1300.00
per month.
para. 6)

(see Findings of Fact paragraph 6, hereinafter FOF

The court further found that appellant had the ability

to earn $3,300.00 per month. (FOF para. 20). The Court further
found appellee's monthly expenses to be $2,400.00 per month. (FOF
para.21).

The court found the appellant's monthly expenses were

$1,700.00 (FOF para. 21).
The appellee claimed expenses of $2,886.90 per month
(TT p.

55 and 128).

The appellant claimed monthly expenses of

$2,220 (TT p. 252). The trial found that appellee's monthly
expense were a little high based upon the fact that some "may not
be appropriate for these calculations and some others may be
slightly high." (TT p. 295).
Appellee submitted exhibit 5 which was a list of her
expenses (TT p. 55). In exhibit 5 appellee

claims that she is

paying "Donations and Contributions" in the amount of $242.00*
Appellee indicates that this amount is actually for what she
referred to as a "ten percent tithe on my income, and a fast
offering.
49).

I believe thaf's probably $80.00 for scouts." (TT p.

Appellee requests the trial court to award her $140.00 per

month as and for auto repairs and expenses.
further wants automobile payments.

(TT p. 44). She

(TT p. 47). Appellee wants a

budget for gifts in the amount of $20.00 per month. (TT p. 4950).

These expenses appear to arbitrary and to a degree intended

to be used for the sole purpose of inflating appellee's budget
for the purpose of being awarded alimony.
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Appellee appears to be

taking the position that she is entitled to maintain the customs
and traditions she had while married to appellant.
and 50)

(see TT p. 49

Here she attempts to show that the payment of "tithing"

was traditional in the marriage and then to show that the giving
of gifts was traditional.

This is a burden she chooses to have

Mr. Kangas absorb for her by paying an increased alimony.

She

further testified that the amount of money she was claiming to
need was based upon the life style that was enjoyed during the
marriage and when said life style consisted of both parties
incomes.

(TT p. 54)

She went on to say that her budget was a

little high, because of the household maintenance.

(TT p. 54).

She then attempts to make her own financial situation appear to
worse than it was by deducting from her income $229.45 per month
for child support (TT p. 56). She would claim all of the
expenses associated with raising the children to justify child
support and alimony (Trial Exhibit 5).
deducting out said support.

And ask for more money by

Appellee would not even want to

include appellant's child support payments in her budget>
Appellant, as a result of the break down of the marital
relationship and this action, moved from the marital residence.
(TT p. 202)
him.

He had one of his minor children, April, living with

(TT p. 241). Appellant testified that he thought it would

be appropriate to sell the house to pay off debts and free up
substantial income (TT p. 226). Appellant testified that he
lived in a small house, and that if he had the chance he would
like to live in a home comparable with the marital residence of
the parties (TT p. 247).

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At the time of trial the trial judge awarded the
plaintiff/appellee alimony in the amount of $700.00.

It is clear

from the testimony of the parties that this was a clear abuse of
discretion by the trial judge.

The parties testified that they

had been married for 24 years. (Trial Transcript Page 28,
hereinafter TT p. 28). They further testified that they had
owned the marital residence for a period of 14 years (TT p. 612).

There was testimony about the actual money spent for living

expenses by the appellee (TT p. 151-154).

This amount was

substantially less than what the trial judge found to be
reasonable living expenses.

The appellant lost a substantial

portion of his standard of living after the parties separated.
The trial court appeared to be more concerned about the wife's
standard of living and not nearly so concerned about the husbands
standard of living.

There appeared to be no attempt to equalize

the parties post divorce standard of living.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
WHETHER THE AWARD OF ALIMONY, IN THIS CASE, IS EXCESSIVE
DOE TO THE FACT THAT APPELLEE IS ABLE TO ENJOY A HIGHER
STANDARD OF LIVING THAN THE APPELLANT?
In this case the trial judge awarded the appellee an
award of alimony in the amount of $700.00 per month.
clear abuse of authority.

This was a

The standard of review to be applied

in this case is whether or not the trial judge abused his
discretion and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed

5

unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.

English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410

(Utah 1977); Crockett v. Crockett, supra.
The parties herein were married on October 11, 1969 (TT
p. 28). They have two minor children who remain at home. (TT p.
29).

In the Decree of Divorce the appellee was awarded the

marital residence.

(see paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce,

hereinafter DD para. 10). The appellee was also awarded alimony
in the amount of $700.00 per month (DD para. 13). The award of
alimony must be based upon a sound analyses by the trial court as
set out in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985).

This

analyses must follow the following steps:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the
wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support.
Id.
In this case the court found that appellee had the
ability to earn $1300.00 per month.

(see Findings of Fact

paragraph 6, hereinafter FOF para. 6) The court further found
that appellant had the ability to earn $3,300.00 per month. (FOF
para. 20). The Court further found appellee's monthly expenses
to be $2,400.00 per month. (FOF para.21).

The court found the

appellant's monthly expenses were $1,700.00 (FOF para. 21).
The appellee claimed expenses of $2,886.90 per month
(TT p. 55 and 128).

The appellant claimed monthly expenses of

$2,220 (TT p. 252). The trial found that appellee's monthly
expense were a little high based upon the fact that some "may not
be appropriate for these calculations and some others may be
6

slightly high." (TT p. 295).
Appellee submitted exhibit 5 which was a list of her
expenses (TT p. 55). In exhibit 5 appellee

claims that she is

paying "Donations and Contributions" in the amount of $242.00.
Appellee indicates that this amount is actually for what she
referred to as a "ten percent tithe on my income, and a fast
offering.
49).

I believe that"s probably $80.00 for scouts." (TT p.

Appellee requests the trial court to award her $140.00 per

month as and for auto repairs and expenses.
further wants automobile payments.

(TT p. 44). She

(TT p. 47). Appellee wants a

budget for gifts in the amount of $20.00 per month. (TT p. 4950).

These expenses appear to arbitrary and to a degree intended

to be used for the sole purpose of inflating appellee's budget
for the purpose of being awarded alimony.

Appellee appears to be

taking the position that she is entitled to maintain the customs
and traditions she had while married to appellant.

(see TT p. 49

and 50) Here she attempts to show that the payment of "tithing"
was traditional in the marriage and then to show that the giving
of gifts was traditional.

This is a burden she chooses to have

Mr. Kangas absorb for her by paying an increased alimony.

She

further testified that the amount of money she was claiming to
need was based upon the life style that was enjoyed during the
marriage and when said life style consisted of both parties
incomes.

(TT p. 54)

She went on to say that her budget was a

little high, because of the household maintenance.

(TT p, 54).

She then attempts to make her own financial situation appear to
worse than it was by deducting from her income $229.45 per month
for child support (TT p. 56). She would claim all of the
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expenses associated with raising the children to justify child
support and alimony (Trial Exhibit 5), And ask for more money by
deducting out said support*

Appellee would not even want to

include appellant's child support payments in her budget.
Appellant, as a result of the break down of the marital
relationship and this action, moved from the marital residence.
(TT p. 202)
him.

He had one of his minor children, April, living with

(TT p. 241). Appellant testified that he thought it would

be appropriate to sell the house to pay off debts and free up
substantial income (TT p. 226). Appellant testified that he
lived in a small house, and that if he had the chance he would
like to live in a home comparable with the marital residence of
the parties (TT p. 247).
This Court in Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1269 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) determined that some of the factors that go into the
determination of an alimony award should be:
[T]he amount and kind of property to be1 divided,
the source of
the property, the parties health,
the parties1 standard of living and respective
financial conditions, their needs and earning
capacities, the duration of the marriage, what the
parties gave up by the marriage, and the
relationship the property division has with the
amount of alimony awarded.
Id.
These factors are to be considered in connection with
the Jones, supra factor previously enumerated.

When a divorce

occurs between a husband and a wife it is the duty of the Court
to determine as nearly as possible what standard of living is
possible and to equalize them as nearly as possible.
occur as a part of the initial Jones analyses.
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This should

Jones enumerates three criteria to be used in
determining the amount of an alimony award.

Implied and inherent

with in this analyses must be 1) the standard of living of the
parties; and 2} the paying spouses monthly expenses.

The Jones

court enumerated three criteria they were:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the
wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support.
Id.
Step number three must, of necessity, contain a two step
breakdown similar to steps 1 and 2 in this analyses.

They should

be the financial conditions and needs of the husband and the
ability of the husband to produce sufficient income for him self.
This analyses should take place in the context of the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and the ability of
the parties joint income to maintain this same standard of living
for each party, equally.

In the event that this is not possible

then the analysis should turn to what standard of living is
appropriate for this broken marriage where the income used to
sustain one home and one family must now sustain two homes and
two families.
This concept was closely stated in Howell V. Howell,
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) when the court stated:
We believe it is consistent
with the goal of
equalizing the parties1 post divorce status to
look to the standard of living existing at or near
the time of trial in determining alimony. This is
consonant with the treatment of both marital
property and child support and is better designed
to equip both parties to go forward with their
separate lives with relatively equal odds. It is
further justified because any future changes in
alimony are limited to instances where a material
9

change of circumstances has occurred. Bridenbauqh
v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). In so holding, we agree with the dissenting
opinion that determining standard of living is a
"fact-sensitive, subjective task." We disagree,
however, that standard of living is determined by
actual expenses alone. Those expenses may be
necessarily lower than needed to maintain an
appropriate standard of living for various
reasons, including, possibly, lack of income. As
Webster says, standard of living includes
"customary or proper status" considering the
parties1 circumstances. Those circumstances should
be evaluated at the time of trial and, contrary to
the dissent, can properly address what situation
would have existed if the parties had not
separated earlier. In this case, the
post-separation
substantial increase in
plaintifffs income was akin to deferred income. In
light of the facts of this case, we conclude that
the trial court erred in looking at the
pre-separation standard of living in setting
alimony, but should have instead considered the
standard of living "during the marriage" up to the
time of trial. In so concluding we do not intend
to establish a rigid rule which must be followed
in all domestic cases, but acknowledge that trial
courts have discretion to determine the standard
of living which existed during the marriage after
consideration of all relevant facts and equitable
principles. In this case, it was inequitable and
an abuse of discretion to pinpoint standard
of
living as of the time of the parties1 separation.
Id.
The court indicates that the time to determine the "standard of
Living" is at the time of the trial in the divorce.

The basis

for this is because of the increases in plaintiff's income.
However the court does not establish this as the rule, hard and
fast*

The critical point is that the Courts have the discretion

to "determine the standard of living which existed during the
marriage"

The court further states that "We believe it is

consistent with the goal of equalizing the parties1 post divorce
status" and then it goes on to address how to arrive at this.
The court recognized that some times a persons standard of living
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is not measurable in monthly expenses, because:
We disagree, however, that standard of living is
determined by actual expenses alone. Those
expenses may be necessarily lower than needed to
maintain an appropriate standard of living for
various reasons, including, possibly, lack of
income. As Webster says, standard of living
includes "customary
or proper status" considering
the parties1 circumstances.
Id.
Here the court clearly indicates that the standard of living of
the parties prior to the divorce is relevant and not just the
amount of monthly expenses.

In Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116

(Utah Ct. App 1990) the court stated this principle a little
clearer when it indicated that sometimes there is just not enough
income to go around to suit both parties needs:
Here, the parties have approximately equal, if
low, standards of living, which is not a
substantial deviation from the "low, minimum"
standard of living which the parties experienced
during the marriage. "This is simply one of those
all-too-frequent situations where the court was
confronted with the impossible task of attempting
to cut one blanket to cover two beds and satisfy
both parties when the truth of the matter is that
they cannot afford a divorce, but must have one
anyway." Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d
150, 151 (1967).
Id.
From this it is critical to understand that it is inappropriate
to cover one bed with an adequate blanket and leave the other bed
inadequately covered.

If warmth and comfort is to be afforded to

one party then that same or comparable degree of warmth and
comfort should be afforded the other party.

Altogether too often

the thought stops with the analysis of the first two points of
Jones.

That is to say many a court has taken the position that

we need to take care of the wife and if the husband has to suffer
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therefore so be it!
What goes into a standard of living is varied and must
be considered on a case by case basis.

Some of the following

should be considered in this case:
WORK
The appellee in this case works one job and this job is
not far from her home.

(TT p. 30). The appellant works at Hill

Air Force Base and is on the road to go to work from two to two
and one-half hours a day (TT p. 137, 242). During this time the
appellant receives no extra compensation.

The appellee indicated

that she would refuse to get an extra job in order to assist
herself after the divorce, she said "I could find a second job,
but I wont because of the children". (TT p. 32 see also TT p.
137).

Mr. Kangas is already working two jobs and the appellee

would suggest that he is capable of getting another job:
Q. [By Mr. Jones] And does Mr. Kangas have the
ability to earn more than he is now earning?
A.

He definitely has the ability to earn more,

yes.
Q.

How is that?

A.

He has skills that he's developed while we

were married. I think he can do many things.
Q.

Prior to working for Hill Air Force Base what

did he do for a living?
A.

He's done many things.

He owned his own

paint contracting business in California.

He's

just done a varied number of things.
Q„

If he had time after the Guard and Hill Air
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Force Base, in your opinion could he do painting?
A.

Yes. And he could make a good living at it.

TT p. 112; see also TT p. 137.
Mrs. Kangas refuses to get a second job, but believes that it
would be alright for Mr. Kangas to get a third jobl
CHILDREN
Mrs. Kangas was awarded the two remaining children and
Mr. Kangas was awarded the custody of none of the children.
While this is a factor not considered often in determining the
standard of living, it is probably one of the most traumatic
events in a divorce.

This has the potential of being traumatic

to all but the spouse awarded custody of the children.
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
The marital residence was purchased by the parties
about 14 years prior to the divorce (TT p. 61-62).

The residence

was refinanced two years prior to the divorce (TT p. 62). Mrs.
Kangas requested that Mr. Kangas pay her $100.00 per month to fix
up the home that the parties could not fix up during the
marriage. (TT p. 67 and 104-106, and Exhibit 5).

She has a big

yard, and wants Mr.Kangas to weed and feed it and to pay for the
care of the yard. (TT p. 43).
On the other hand Mr. Kangas is to start out all over
again, and this is after his credit is tied up in the house
awarded to the appellee.

Mr. Kangas1 standard of living drops.

He no longer is able to claim the mortgage insurance as a tax
deduction.

(TT p. 240). M. Kangas does not have the ability to

build an equity in real property.

(TT p. 240). Mr Kangas is

living in a much smaller home than when he was married.
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He is

now living in a one bathroom and two bedroom rented home.

The

home purchased and lived in during the marriage was a four
bedroom spacious home.

(TT p. 247).

Clearly the post standard of living has not been
equalized as between theses two parties. Mrs. Kangas has had to
make little if any adjustments to her standard of living and Mr.
Kangas has had to take a tremendous drop in his standard of
living just to get by.
MONTHLY EXPENSES
Mrs. Kangas testified that her monthly needs were
(based upon her budget) $2,886.90. The court found that her
reasonable expenses were $2,400.00 without explaining the
departure from her claim.

The court found that Mr. Kangas1

monthly expenses were $1,700.00 per month.
In testimony there was clear evidence that Mrs. Kangas
consistently got by on less than $2,400.00 per month.
showed that Mrs. Kangas had spent

$2,030.56 (including $1,000.00

for attorneyfs fees) In February 1993.
spent $910.85.

In March of 1993 she

In April 1993 she spent $1,944.41.

she spent $1,745.44.

Exhibit 21

In May 1993

In June 1993 she spent $2,056.64.

In July

1993 she spent $2,104.89. (See TT p. 151-154 and Exhibit 21).

At

no point does appellee's monthly expenses approach the level of
what she claimed she would need on a monthly basis nor the amount
the court found reasonable.

Mrs. Kangas indicated that this was

reflective of her average cost of living (TT p. 154). During
this time period Mrs. Kangas continued to pay her tithing
(contributions) the Mormon Church.

(TT p. 49). Mrs. Kangas1

actual cost of living was much less than she represented to the
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court.

Mrs. Kangas has sufficient money available to her to live

in a reasonable fashion and still donate money each month to the
church and scouts. Mrs. Kangas was in a position to borrow money
and to go on a trip with the boys.

She borrowed $1,000.00 she

wasnft sure if she would need $500.00 or more but this was to go
on a trip.

Mrs. Kangas has been able to save about $200.00 in

the period between January and August 1993 (TT p. 151-154).
In contrast, Mr. Kangas has not been able to save any
money.

(TT p. 215). Mr. Kangas has not been able to pay tithing

(contributions to the church) (TT p. 234). Mr. Kangas has no
funds to buy clothing routinely (TT p. 236). Mr. Kangas has
taken from his gross pay about $1,000.00 per month (TT p. 239).
Mr. Kangas can not afford to go on any vacations (TT p. 249).
During the marriage, Mr. Kangas used to participate in sport
races, but now he does not have the money to pay the entry fees
(TT p. 250). Mr. Kangas wished he had a washer and dryer, Mrs
Kangas does (TT p. 250).
OPINION OF STANDARD OF LIVING
Mrs. Kangas does not feel that equality is a factor to
be considered in this matter.
Q. [By Mr. Oliver]

She testified that:
You would like to take 34

[this is after she testified that the joint income
of the parties was $49,000.00] and leave Ralph
[Mr. Kangas] with 15, is that correct?
A.

That's the way it works out.

That's what I

need.
Q.

Uh-huh.

Now, You think that it's appropriate

that your standard of living be higher than Mr.
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Kangas!s after the divorce?
A.

Umm, I believe hefs capable where I'm not. I

have no other income, none. (See TT. p. 141-142).
Mr. Kangas on the other hand testified to how nice it would be to
be able to live so high on the hog, when he testified that:
Q. [By Mr. Oliver]

Are you living anywhere close

to the standard of living you were living in prior
to your separation from Linda [Mrs. Kangas]?
A.
Q.

No absolutely not.
Would you right now trade places with Linda,

right even-Steven with the way things are, as far
as standards of living goes?
A.

Absolutely, (see TT page 251).

The post divorce standard of living of the parties should be
proportionate.

One party should not be given an inherently

better standard of living than the other party.

This court in

Howell, supra stated:
The alimony award, however, need not be large
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of
living of the paying spouse below that of the
receiving spouse. Alimony may only raise the
standard of living of the receiving spouse until
it is roughly equal to that of the paying spouse.
It is in this sense that alimony should seek "to
the extent possible, [to] equalize the parties'
respective post-divorce living standards." Rasband
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
In this case the inequities are obvious.

In this case

the trial court abused his discretion in the amount of alimony
awarded to the appellee.

This abuse of discretion is clear and
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creates a substantial injustice and prejudice.

Mr. Kangas should

be able to enjoy the same post divorce standard of living as does
Mrs. Kangas or there should be a re-evaluation of the alimony in
this case.
In the case of Bingham v, Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah
Ct App 1994) the court considered the issue of an alimony award
which exceeded the receiving parties established need and ruled
as follows:
Where the trial court has offered no explanation
for such a discrepancy, we agree with defendant
that the court should not have awarded plaintiff
more than her established needs required,
regardless of defendant's ability to pay this
excess amount.
Id.
That the amount of alimony awarded was in excess of appellee's
monthly needs is evidenced by Exhibit 21. This is clearly an
abuse of discretion and is clearly prejudicial to the appellant.
CONCLUSION
This case should be remanded back to the trial court
with instructions that the court should equalize the post divorce
standard of living of the parties, after the analyses is
completed involving the Jones factors. This court should further
expand the Jones factors so that a clear picture is established
for the parties, the attorneys and the trial judge, so that
equitable resolutions occur through proper application of the
law.

Dated this

day of May, 1995.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

78-2a-3

m

JUDICIAL CODE

a successor is appointed a n d qualified. T h e presiding
judge of t h e Court of Appeals shall receive a s additional compensation $1,000 per a n n u m or fraction
thereof for t h e period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit a n d render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. T h e Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for t h e selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals m a y not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years a n d until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of t h e Court of Appeals
may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n two successive
terms. T h e Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in t h e absence or
incapacity of t h e presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer t h e rotation a n d scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with t h e Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over t h e meetings of t h e
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by t h e Supreme
Court a n d t h e Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for t h e Court of Appeals a r e the
same as for the Supreme Court.
1988

•(h)- appeals from t h e orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of tlie
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, b u t not limited to
divorce, a n n u l m e n t , property division, child cus^
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from t h e U t a h Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to t h e Court of Appeals
from t h e Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion-only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to t h e Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination a n y m a t t e r over which t h e Court
of Appeals h a s original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1992

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals h a s jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) t h e final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
3
or appeals from t h e district court review of infor^
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex^
cept t h e Public Service Commission, State Tax
^ * Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
* Gas, a n d Mining, a n d t h e state engineer;
^
(b) appeals from t h e district court review of:
Ov
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
\
political subdivisions of the state or other loV^
cal agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
. ^ (c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from t h e circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving a n y other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or t h e sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;

Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when circuit and district court
merged.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative
System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and
fines.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to
counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
78-3-21.5.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties.
78-3-23.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and responsibilities.

78-2a-4. R e v i e w of actions b y S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
1986
78-2a-5. Location of Court of A p p e a l s .
The Court of Appeals h a s its principal location in
Salt Lake City. T h e Court of Appeals m a y perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.
1986

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS

u a u v c uiuci estauusmiig ur mutinying an awara 01
child support entered on or after J u l y 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing
or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines are presumed to be
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of
this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the
record supporting the conclusion t h a t complying with
_a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in t h a t case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of t h a t parent and are
not children in common to both parties may at
the option of either party be taken into account
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a
child support award, as provided in Subsection
(5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared
t h a t compute the obligations of the respective
parents for the additional children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before determining the
award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award,
consideration of natural or adoptive children other
than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be
applied to justify a decrease in the award.
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment
of the guidelines and any subsequent change in the
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for modification
of a court order, if there is a difference of at least 25%
between the existing order and the guidelines. With
regard to IV-D cases, the office may request modification, in accordance with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, no more
often t h a n once every three years.
1990
78-45-7.3.

P r o c e d u r e — D o c u m e n t a t i o n — Stipulation.
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the
moving party shall submit:
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(c) a written statement indicating whether or
not the amount of child support requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by
the moving party, based on the best evidence
available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and
may only be offered after a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act, in an
administrative proceeding.

UJ a completed cnua support worksheet;
(ii) the financial verification required by
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(iit) a
written
statement
indicating
whether or not the amount of child support
requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review the adequacy of a
child support order negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or
combined child support and alimony is adequate
under the guidelines if the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds the
total child support award required by the guidelines. When t h e stipulated amount exceeds the
guidelines, it irfay be awarded without a finding
under Section 78-45-7.2.
1990
78-45-7.4.

Obligation — Adjusted g r o s s income

used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating
each parent's share of the child support award. Only
income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child
may be used to determine the award under these
guidelines.
1989
78-45-7.5.

Determination of g r o s s i n c o m e — Im-

puted income.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions,
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone,
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment-compensation, disability insurance
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested"
government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited
to the equivalent of one full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy
program, the Job Training Partnership Act,
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits
received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by
subtracting necessary expenses required for selfemployment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross
income available to the parent to satisfy a child
support award. Only those expenses necessary to
allow the business to operate at a reasonable
level may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business
income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be
computed on an annual basis and then recalcu-
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lated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-todate pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least
the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income
from nonearned sources according to the source.
Verification of income from records maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be
substituted for employer statements and income
tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be
used to determine whether an underemployment
or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the
parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential
and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the
following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for
the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum
wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills;
or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs
of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings
of a child who is the subject of a child support
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited
as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount
against the potential obligation of t h a t parent.
Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
1990
78-45-7.6.

Adjusted gross income.

(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the amount calculated by subtracting from
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid
and child support previously ordered.
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the
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parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding. In establishing alimony, t h e court shall consider
t h a t in determining the child support, the guidelines
do not provide a deduction from gross income for alimony.
1989
78-45-7.7.

Calculation of obligations.

(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted
gross incomes.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2, the total
child support~award-shalUbedetermined as follows:.
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table.
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross .income, anil "subtracting
from the products the children's portion of any

monthly payments made directly by each parent
for medical and dental insurance premiums.

(c) Allocate monthly work-related child care
costs equally to each parent.
(d) Calculate the total child support award by
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the
base child support obligation calculated in Subsection (2)(b) and the amount allocated in Subsection (2)(c). Include in the order both amounts
and the total child support award.
(3) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child support obligations for up
to ten children. For more t h a n ten children, additional amounts shall be added to.the Jba.se child support obligation shown. The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total number of
children, not an amount per child.
1990

78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the total child support
award shall be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calculated amount between the parents in proportion
to the number of children for whom each parent
has physical custody. The amounts so calculated
are a tentative base child support obligation due
each parent from the other parent for support of
the child or children for whom each parent has
physical custody.
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support
obligation due each parent by the percentage
that the other parent's adjusted gross income
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income
of both parents.
(3) Subtract from the products in Subsection
T2) the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical
and dental insurance premiums.
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection
(3) from the larger amount to determine the base
child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation.
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related
child care costs equally to each parent.

ARTICLE L DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Sec 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
AH men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
1896

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

